Ironing Without Control
Ironing Without Control
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熨烫不受控制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Juuso Toikka
中科院分区：
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作者：
Juuso Toikka
我扩展了迈尔森的[R]。迈尔森，最优拍卖设计，数学。③。Res. 6(1981) 58-73]熨烫技术更一般的目标函数。该方法基于广义虚剩余的概念，即使在激励相容所隐含的单调性约束存在约束时，虚剩余也能逐点最大化。它适用于标准虚剩余在分配上弱凹或在分配和类型上适当可分的拟线性委托-代理模型。除了单调性之外，不需要对分配规则做任何假设。
I extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity.