Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers
Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
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发表时间：
1990-05
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
David Besanko;Wayne L. Winston
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Besanko;Wayne L. Winston
本文研究了垄断者销售新产品的跨期定价问题。这篇论文与现有的关于跨期定价的管理科学文献的主要区别在于，假设消费者是跨期效用最大化者。刻画并证明了一个子博弈完全纳什均衡定价策略包含跨期价格歧视。我们将这一政策与垄断者面对短视消费者的最优政策进行比较，发现对于任何给定的状态，理性消费者的价格总是低于短视消费者的价格。对于看似合理的参数值，可以证明消费者理性的假设会导致最优价格的巨大差异。此外，如果面对理性消费者的垄断者实施最优短视消费者定价政策，利润可能显著低于垄断者遵循理性消费者均衡定价政策时的利润。
This paper considers the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist marketing a new product. The key feature differentiating this paper from the extant management science literature on intertemporal pricing is the assumption that consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium pricing policy is characterized and shown to involve intertemporal price discrimination. We compare this policy to the optimal policy for a monopolist facing myopic consumers and find that for any given state, prices are always lower with rational consumers than with myopic consumers. For plausible parameter values the assumption of consumer rationality can be shown to lead to large differences in optimal prices. Moreover, if a monopolist facing rational consumers implements the optimal myopic consumer pricing policy, profits can be significantly less than if the monopolist follows the equilibrium pricing policy for rational consumers.