A Novel Memristor-Based Hardware Security Primitive
A Novel Memristor-Based Hardware Security Primitive
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DOI：
10.1145/2736285
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发表时间：
2015-05-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Pradhan, Dhiraj K.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mathew, Jimson;Chakraborty, Rajat Subhra;Pradhan, Dhiraj K.
忆阻器是一个令人兴奋的新增加的剧目的基本电路元件。最初采用传统数学密码术的许多安全协议的替代方案涉及新颖的硬件安全原语，例如物理不可克隆功能（PUF）。在这篇文章中，我们提出了一种新的混合忆阻器-CMOS PUF电路，并证明其适用性，通过广泛的模拟环境和工艺变化的影响。所提出的PUF电路具有比先前提出的基于忆阻器的PUF电路少得多的硬件开销，同时由于忆阻器级的挑战相关延迟而固有地抵抗基于机器学习的建模攻击。所提出的PUF可以方便地用于许多安全应用和基于硬件本质安全的协议。
Memristor is an exciting new addition to the repertoire of fundamental circuit elements. Alternatives to many security protocols originally employing traditional mathematical cryptography involve novel hardware security primitives, such as Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In this article, we propose a novel hybrid memristor-CMOS PUF circuit and demonstrate its suitability through extensive simulations of environmental and process variation effects. The proposed PUF circuit has substantially less hardware overhead than previously proposed memristor-based PUF circuits while being inherently resistant to machine learning-based modeling attacks because of challenge-dependent delays of the memristor stages. The proposed PUF can be conveniently used in many security applications and protocols based on hardware-intrinsic security.