The effect of accuracy instructions on Coronavirus‐related belief change following conversational interactions

The effect of accuracy instructions on Coronavirus‐related belief change following conversational interactions
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对话互动后准确性指令对冠状病毒相关信念变化的影响

DOI:
10.1002/acp.3972
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发表时间:
2022
影响因子:
2.4
通讯作者:
Coman, Alin
Coman, Alin
中科院分区:
心理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Vlasceanu, Madalina;Coman, Alin

文献摘要

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在高风险环境中,例如在流行病期间,人们会接触到大量准确和不准确的信息。在暴露之后,他们通常会互相讨论信息。在这里,我们评估这种对话对信念的影响。126名M-Turk参与者对一组COVID-19声明的准确性进行了评估,包括准确信息,不准确信息和阴谋论(预测试)。然后他们被配对,并被要求讨论这些陈述(低认知条件)或只讨论他们认为正确的陈述(高认知条件)。最后,他们再次对最初陈述的准确性进行评级(后测试)。我们没有发现认知条件对信念变化的影响。然而,我们发现,个体对他们的谈话伙伴是敏感的,并根据他们的伙伴传达的信念改变他们的信念。在探索性分析中,我们报告了相信COVID-19阴谋的预测因素。
In a high‐risk environment, such as during an epidemic, people are exposed to a large amount of information, both accurate and inaccurate. Following exposure, they typically discuss the information with each other. Here, we assess the effects of such conversations on beliefs. A sample of 126 M‐Turk participants rated the accuracy of a set of COVID‐19 statements, including accurate information, inaccurate information, and conspiracy theories (pre‐test). They were then paired and asked to discuss these statements (low epistemic condition) or to discuss only the statements they thought were accurate (high epistemic condition). Finally, they rated the accuracy of the initial statements again (post‐test). We do not find an effect of the epistemic condition on belief change. However, we find that individuals are sensitive to their conversational partners and change their beliefs according to their partners' conveyed beliefs. In exploratory analyses, we report predictors of believing COVID‐19 conspiracies.