The Legal Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance : An Empirical Study on Eighteen Developing Countries in the 1990s
The Legal Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance : An Empirical Study on Eighteen Developing Countries in the 1990s
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中央银行的合法独立性与宏观经济表现:对20世纪90年代18个发展中国家的实证研究
DOI：
10.18999/forids.23.201
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Waranya Atchariyachanvanich
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Waranya Atchariyachanvanich
本文旨在完善Cukierman（1992）关于中央银行独立性对发展中国家经济绩效的作用的分析，认识到中央银行法的法律执行在中央银行目标问责制的明确性、透明度、协调和应急措施方面的重要性。为此，我们构建了一个执法指数。我们的实证研究表明，央行法定独立性水平的提高与长期平均通货膨胀率的降低有关。从央行独立性之外的短期分析中发现，执法是影响宏观经济表现的另一个重要独立因素。在短期内，虽然增加央行独立性可能会导致实际增长和失业之间的权衡，但促进执法往往只会带来好处。此外，汇率制度在影响中央银行独立性和宏观经济变量的执法效益权衡的性质方面也起着重要作用。对于平均通货膨胀率不过高的发展中国家，我们的主要建议是，为了获得较好的短期宏观经济表现，应更多地强调央行法律的执法，而不是央行法律上的独立性。
This article aims at improving the analysis of Cukierman(1992)on the role of central bank independence on economic performance of developing countries by recognizing the importance of legal enforcement of central bank law in terms of clarity of objective(s) accountability tranparency coordination and contingency measures of the central bank. For this purpose we construct a legal enforcement index. Our empirical study suggests that increasing the level of legal central bank independence is associated with the reduction in long‑term average inflation rates. From short‑term analysis beyond central bank independence legal enforcement is discovered as another significant independent factor that has implications on macroeconomic performance. In the short‑term while increasing central bank independence may cause tradeoffs on real growth and unemployment promoting legal enforcement tends to lead only to benefits. Moreover exchange rate regime also plays a significant role in influencing the nature of tradeoffs of central bank independence and benefits of legal enforcement on macroeconomic variables. Our main recommendation for developing countries where in the average inflation rates are not excessive is that the emphasis should be placed more on legal enforcement of central bank law than on legal central bank independence for a preferable short‑term macroeconomic performance.