Same, Models and Representation
Same, Models and Representation
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相同，模型和表示
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Peter Lasersohn
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文献类型：
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作者：
Peter Lasersohn
模型理论语义学中使用的模型与模型所代表的“世界”之间的关系是什么？更具体地说，让我们考虑这样一个问题：模型中的单个个体、事件、时间或其他元素是否可以用来表示真实的世界中的多个个体、事件、时间或其他对象。应该理解，这里的问题不是对象组是否可以用某种Link（1983）风格的“复数个体”来表示;相反，这个想法是使用一个模型，其中忽略了个体之间的实用上无关的区别，使得该模型将一个以上的现实世界实体“合并”成单个模型理论实体，把它们看作是同一个物体。据我所知，这一观点在农伯格（Nunberg，1984）中得到了最明确和最系统的论证;尽管在其他一些地方也曾短暂或偶然地暗示或提出过相关的观点。本文提出了反对这种技术的论点，Nunberg开发的，并提出了另一种方法来处理的情况下，现实世界中的个人之间的区别是语用可验证的，基于Lasersohn（1999）提出的“语用光环”的设备。在考虑这个问题时，我们还必须考虑在模型论语义学中使用模型的确切意义;尽管这看起来是一个非常基本的问题，也是我们整个技术的基础，但我认为这仍然是一个存在大量模糊和思想分歧的问题。令人惊讶的是，语义学家经常使用本质上相同的形式主义，但对形式主义的理解却非常不同。
What is the relation between models, as used in model-theoretic semantics, and the “world” which models represent? More specifically, let us consider the question of whether a single individual, event, time or other element in a model might be used to represent more than one individual, event, time or other object in the real world. It should be understood that the question here is not whether groups of objects may be represented with some sort of “plural individual” in the style of Link (1983); rather, the idea is to use a model in which pragmatically irrelevant distinctions between individuals are ignored, so that the model “conflates” more than one realworld entity into a single model-theoretic entity, representing them as though they were the same object. This idea was argued for most explicitly and systematically, to my knowledge, in Nunberg (1984); though related ideas have been hinted at or suggested briefly or casually in a number of other places. The present paper provides arguments against this technique, as developed by Nunberg, and suggests an alternative approach to dealing with cases where the distinction between real-world individuals is pragmatically ignorable, based on the device of “Pragmatic Halos” presented in Lasersohn (1999). In considering this issue, we will also have to consider exactly what the point is of using models in model-theoretic semantics; and although this seems like a very elementary issue, and one which lies at the foundation of our whole technique, I think it is still an issue about which there is a great deal of obscurity and differences in thinking. To a surprising degree, semanticists often use essentially identical formalism, yet understand that formalism very differently.