PROVISION OF STEP-LEVEL PUBLIC GOODS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
PROVISION OF STEP-LEVEL PUBLIC GOODS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
复制标题
不确定性下阶梯级公共物品的提供
DOI：
10.1177/104346397009002002
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
R. Suleiman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Suleiman
在一个典型的博弈中，考察对提供阶梯级公共产品的自愿贡献，规模为n的小组中的每个成员都收到一笔捐赠，然后私下匿名决定其中有多少用于提供公共产品。当且仅当他们的总贡献等于或大于某个门槛时，才向所有集团成员提供货物。虽然以前的研究假设群体成员拥有关于阈值的完整信息，但本文放松了这一假设，将阈值视为具有常见分布的随机变量。提出了三种模型：主观期望值模型、合作模型和策略模型来解释个体的贡献决策。然后推导出一般解，并对其在阈值均匀分布的情况下的预测进行评估。
In a typical game examining voluntary contribution to the provision of step-level public goods, each member of a group of size n receives an endowment and then decides privately and anonymously how much of it to contribute for the provision of the good. The good is provided to all group members if and only if their total contribution is equal to, or larger than some threshold. While previous research assumed that group members have complete information about the threshold, the present article relaxes this assumption by treating the threshold as a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Three models, a subjective expected value model, a cooperative model and a strategic model are proposed to account for the individual's contribution decision. General solutions are then derived and their predictions for the case of a uniformly distributed threshold are evaluated.