DARIA: Designing Actuators to Resist Arbitrary Attacks Against Cyber-Physical Systems
DARIA: Designing Actuators to Resist Arbitrary Attacks Against Cyber-Physical Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/eurosp48549.2020.00029
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发表时间：
2020-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Giraldo;Sahand Hadizadeh Kafash;Justin Ruths;A. Cárdenas
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文献类型：
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作者：
J. Giraldo;Sahand Hadizadeh Kafash;Justin Ruths;A. Cárdenas
在过去的十年中，我们已经看到了一个活跃的研究社区提出了对网络物理系统（CPS）的攻击和防御。大多数这些攻击和防御本质上都是启发式的，将攻击者限制在一组预定义的操作中，并提出具有不明确安全保证的防御。在本文中，我们提出了一个通用的对手模型，可以捕获任何类型的攻击（我们的攻击者不受约束，以遵循特定的攻击，如重放，延迟或偏见），并使用它来设计安全机制，可证明的安全保证。特别是，我们提出了一个新的安全设计范式，我们称之为DARIA：设计执行器，以抵御任意攻击。DARIA背后的主要思想是设计执行器的物理限制，以防止攻击者任意操纵系统，而不管他们的攻击点（传感器或执行器）或特定的攻击算法（偏差，重放，延迟等）。据我们所知，我们是第一个提出对控制回路中的执行器进行物理限制设计的研究团队，以保持系统安全免受攻击。我们证明了我们的建议的车辆排队和工业过程的模拟的一般性。
In the past decade we have seen an active research community proposing attacks and defenses to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Most of these attacks and defenses have been heuristic in nature, limiting the attacker to a set of predefined operations, and proposing defenses with unclear security guarantees. In this paper, we propose a generic adversary model that can capture any type of attack (our attacker is not constrained to follow specific attacks such as replay, delay, or bias) and use it to design security mechanisms with provable security guarantees. In particular, we propose a new secure design paradigm we call DARIA: Designing Actuators to Resist arbItrary Attacks. The main idea behind DARIA is the design of physical limits to actuators in order to prevent attackers from arbitrarily manipulating the system, irrespective of their point of attack (sensors or actuators) or the specific attack algorithm (bias, replay, delays, etc.). As far as we are aware, we are the first research team to propose the design of physical limits to actuators in a control loop in order to keep the system secure against attacks. We demonstrate the generality of our proposal on simulations of vehicular platooning and industrial processes.