Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining
复制标题
联盟谈判中稳态均衡收益的独特性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. McLennan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hülya Eraslan;A. McLennan
我们研究了一个连续讨价还价的模型，在每个阶段达成协议之前，提议者的身份是随机确定的，提议者建议划分一个大小为1的馅饼，每个其他代理人要么批准或拒绝该建议，如果批准代理人的集合是提议者的获胜联盟，则该建议被实施。利用不动点指数理论证明了该博弈的平稳均衡期望收益是唯一的。这推广了Eraslan [34]，因为：（a）对获胜联盟的集合结构没有限制;（B）不同的提议者可能有不同的获胜联盟集合;（c）可能存在没有提议者被选中的正概率。
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposerʼs identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan [34] insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected.