Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets
Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets
复制标题
多边转让市场中纵向联合组织的竞争性价格
DOI：
10.1007/s10058-016-0193-1
复制
发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
M. Álvarez
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
O. Tejada;M. Álvarez
我们认为市场是由许多完全互补和同质的商品组成的。我们集中研究生产这些商品的公司合并并形成垂直财团的动机。主要结果表明，相关市场博弈的核仁对应于具有以下属性的唯一价格向量：(i)它们是垂直联合的，（ii）它们是竞争性的，（iii）它们产生双边市场中买家和卖家的平均最优配置，（iv）它们依赖于交易者的议价能力，而不依赖于他们的身份。这个证明使用了我们的市场博弈类和整个破产博弈类之间的同构性。
We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyers- and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders’ bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games.