Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games
Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004
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发表时间：
2008-09-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Vertova, Pietro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Galbiati, Roberto;Vertova, Pietro
法律通过惩罚和奖励（“激励”）的方式表达了行为规则（“义务”）。传统经济学文献对激励在塑造个人行为中的作用进行了大量分析。相反，人们对义务的具体作用知之甚少。在本文中，我们测试义务是否对公共利益博弈中的合作有任何独立影响。结果表明。对于给定的边际激励，义务所要求的最低缴款水平的不同决定了平均缴款水平的显着不同。而且。义务本身无法长期维持合作，即使它们影响平均捐款的下降速度。最后。最低捐款的意外变化对合作水平产生不对称的动态影响：减少并不会改变合作下降的趋势。而增加会导致平均贡献暂时重新开始。 (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. 保留所有权利。
Laws express rules of conduct ('obligations') enforced by the means of penalties and rewards ('incentives'). The role of incentives in shaping individual behaviour has been largely analysed in the traditional economic literature. On the contrary, very little is known about the specific role of obligations. In this paper we test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in a public good game. The results show that. for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum contribution required by obligation determine significantly different levels of average contributions. Moreover. obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time, even if they affect the rate of decline of average contributions. Finally. unexpected changes in the minimum contribution have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the descending trend of cooperation. whereas an increase induces a temporary re-start in average contributions. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.