Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games
Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games
复制标题
有限弱单边竞争博弈中的纯策略均衡
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-015-0481-y
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Iimura;T. and Watanabe;T.
我们考虑了有限版的弱单边竞争博弈(Kats and Thisse，见Int J游戏理论，21：291-299,1992)，证明了如果该博弈是对称的、拟凹的(或单峰的)，则它具有纯策略纳什均衡。这一结果的第一个含义是，单边竞争或两人弱单边竞争有限对策在纯策略下在Nash意义下是可解的。我们还刻画了这些有限对策的均衡集。第二个含义是有限对策中存在有限种群演化稳定的纯策略均衡，如果它是对称的、拟凹的、弱单边竞争的。
We consider the finite version of theweakly unilaterally competitivegame (Kats and Thisse, in Int J Game Theory 21:291–299, 1992) and show that this game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if it is symmetric and quasiconcave (or single-peaked). The first implication of this result is that unilaterally competitive or two-person weakly unilaterally competitive finite games are solvable in the sense of Nash, in pure strategies. We also characterize the set of equilibria of these finite games. The second implication is that there exists a finite population evolutionarily stable pure strategy equilibrium in a finite game, if it is symmetric, quasiconcave, and weakly unilaterally competitive.