Consumption Taxes and Economic Efficiency with Idiosyncratic Wage Shocks
Consumption Taxes and Economic Efficiency with Idiosyncratic Wage Shocks
复制标题
特殊工资冲击下的消费税和经济效率
DOI：
10.1086/432137
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Kent A. Smetters
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shin’ichi Nishiyama;Kent A. Smetters
根本性的税收改革是在一个世代重叠的模型中进行考察的，在这个模型中，不同的代理人面临着特殊的工资冲击和寿命的不确定性。累进所得税被统一消费税取代。如果特殊的工资冲击是可保的(即，没有风险)，这种改革提高了(临时)效率，这一结果与以前的文献一致。但是，如果更现实地说，工资冲击是不可保的，那么这种改革就会降低效率，即使国民财富和产出在整个转型过程中都有所增长。这种效率损失在很大程度上源于以前由累进税制提供的代内风险分担减少。
Fundamental tax reform is examined in an overlapping‐generations model in which heterogeneous agents face idiosyncratic wage shocks and longevity uncertainty. A progressive income tax is replaced with a flat consumption tax. If idiosyncratic wage shocks are insurable (i.e., no risk), this reform improves (interim) efficiency, a result consistent with the previous literature. But if, more realistically, wage shocks are uninsurable, this reform reduces efficiency, even though national wealth and output increase over the entire transition path. This efficiency loss, in large part, stems from reduced intragenerational risk sharing that was previously provided by the progressive tax system.