The Operational Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve Position Doctrine
The Operational Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve Position Doctrine
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货币政策的操作目标与储备头寸主义的兴衰
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.533132
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
U. Bindseil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
U. Bindseil
在1914年之前，毫无疑问，中央银行的政策首先意味着控制短期利率。20世纪20年代初，随着美国“储备头寸学说”（RPD）的诞生，这种情况发生了巨大变化。根据这一学说，中央银行应该通过公开市场操作来引导一些储备概念，这将通过货币乘数影响货币总量和最终目标。虽然美联储只是在20世纪90年代才恢复了对短期利率的明确指导，但例如英格兰银行从未采用过RPD。本文解释了RPD的惊人兴衰。RPD的持久性是由中央银行家和学者的共生关系解释的，中央银行家可能部分同情RPD，因为它掩盖了他们对短期利率的责任，而学者们太急于简化货币市场和中央银行操作的一些关键特征。JEL分类：E43，E52，B22
Before 1914, there was little doubt that central bank policy meant first of all control of short term interest rates. This changed dramatically in the early 1920s with the birth of “reserve position doctrine” (RPD) in the US, according to which a central bank should, via open market operation, steer some reserve concept, which would impact via the money multiplier on monetary aggregates and ultimate goals. While the Fed returned to an unambiguous steering of short term interest rates only in the 1990s, for example the Bank of England never adopted RPD. This paper explains the astonishing rise and fall of RPD. The endurance of RPD is explained by a symbiosis of central bankers who may have partially sympathised with RPD since it masked their responsibility for short term interest rates, and academics who were too eager to simplify away some key features of money markets and central bank operations. JEL Classification: E43, E52, B22