Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding
Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding
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DOI：
10.1007/s10490-008-9109-0
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发表时间：
2009-07
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
P. Heugens;M. Essen;H. Oosterhout
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Heugens;M. Essen;H. Oosterhout
本文对亚洲集中持股与企业财务绩效之间的关系进行了元分析。在跨国家层面的分析中，我们发现这两个变量之间存在微小但显著的正相关。这一发现表明，在中小股东法律保护不完善的地区，股权集中是一种有效的公司治理策略。然而，对这种聚集效应的关注掩盖了效应大小分布中真正的异质性的存在。我们有目的地通过探索所有者身份和国家机构层面的调节效应来模拟这种异质性。关于所有者身份，我们发现，我们对外国所有者的关注关系比对国内所有者的关系更密切，而且纯粹的“市场”投资者的表现优于与公司有成倍联系的“稳定”或“内部”所有者。关于制度，我们发现，要使集中所有权成为一种有效的公司治理战略，必须有一定的制度发展门槛。然而，我们也发现，对股东的强有力的法律保护使所有权集中变得无关紧要，因此是多余的。最后，在所有者可以很容易地从其控制的公司中获取私人利益的司法管辖区，焦点关系变得更弱，可能是因为少数股东被征用。
We present a meta-analysis of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial performance in Asia. At the cross-national level of analysis, we find a small but significant positive association between both variables. This finding suggests that in regions with less than perfect legal protection of minority shareholders, ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance strategy. Yet, a focus on this aggregate effect alone conceals the existence of true heterogeneity in the effect size distribution. We purposefully model this heterogeneity by exploring moderating effects at the levels of owner identity and national institutions. Regarding owner identity, we find that our focal relationship is stronger for foreign than for domestic owners, and that pure “market” investors outperform “stable” or “inside” owners whom are multiply tied to the firm. Regarding institutions, we find that a certain threshold level of institutional development is necessary to make concentrated ownership an effective corporate governance strategy. Yet we also find that strong legal protection of shareholders makes ownership concentration inconsequential and therefore redundant. Finally, in jurisdictions where owners can easily extract private benefits from the corporations they control, the focal relationship becomes weaker, presumably due to minority shareholder expropriation.