Effects of directional migration for pursuit of profitable circumstances in evolutionary games
Effects of directional migration for pursuit of profitable circumstances in evolutionary games
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进化博弈中定向迁移对追求盈利环境的影响
DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2021.110709
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发表时间：
2021-03
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
Yang Junzhong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhang Lan;Huang Changwei;Li Haihong;Dai Qionglin;Yang Junzhong
在进化博弈中，迁移已被证实促进了合作的进化。两个因素决定了迁移对合作的影响：个体的迁移速度和迁移方向。在之前的研究中，迁移方向要么是随机确定的，要么是参考一些理性因素来决定的，比如向合作者靠近，逃离叛逃者。然而，为了追求有利的环境，个人可能会根据邻居的趋势而不是自己的立场来决定自己的迁移方向。在此工作中，我们通过在连续二维平面上分别引入两种不同方向的迁移来提出两个模型。其中一个模型是个体采用合作邻居的平均迁移方向，称为合作跟随迁移模型（cooperative -following， CF）。在另一种迁移模型中，个体向与其有缺陷的邻居相反的方向移动。结果表明，对于两种模型，适当的迁移速度都能显著促进合作，并且存在使种群合作水平最大化的最优迁移速度。此外，我们发现在大多数参数区域，CF模型在提高协作性方面优于DL模型。此外，我们还对具有不同交互半径和不同种群密度的模型进行了仿真，发现通过迁移速度对合作进行优化仍然存在。
Migration has been verified to promote the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games. Two factors determine the impacts of migration on cooperation, the migration speed and the migration direction of individuals. In previous works, migration direction is determined either in a random way or by referring to some rational factors, such as moving closer to cooperators and escaping away from defectors. However, in order to pursue profitable circumstances, individuals might decide their migration direction based on the neighbors’ trends instead of their positions. In this work, we propose two models by introducing two different directional migrations respectively into evolutionary games in a continuous two-dimensional plane. In one model, individuals adopt the average migration directions of their cooperative neighbors, which is called the cooperator-following (CF) migration model. In the other one, the defector-leaving (DL) migration model, individuals move in the opposite directions to their defective neighbors. Our results show that, for both models, the appropriate migration speeds can significantly promote cooperation and there exist optimal speeds to maximize the cooperation level in the population. Moreover, we find that the CF model is superior to the DL model in improving cooperation in most parameter regions. Besides, we simulate the models with different interaction radiuses and different population densities, and find that the optimization of cooperation by the migration speed still exist.
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