ADMISSIBILITY IN GAMES
ADMISSIBILITY IN GAMES
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DOI：
10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00835.x
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发表时间：
2008-03
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Adam Brandenburger;A. Friedenberg;H. Keisler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Adam Brandenburger;A. Friedenberg;H. Keisler
假设游戏中的每个玩家都是理性的，每个玩家都认为其他玩家是理性的，依此类推。此外，假设理性被认为包含了一项可采纳性要求--即避免弱支配策略。可以采用哪些策略？我们提供了一个解决这个问题的认知框架。具体地说，我们提出了理性条件和m阶理性假设(RMAR)和理性和共同理性假设(RCAR)。我们证明了：(I)RCAR是由一个我们称之为“自允许集”的解概念来刻画的；(Ii)在一个“完全”型结构中，RMAR是由在m+1轮不可允许策略的消除中存活下来的策略集来刻画的；(Iii)在一定条件下，RCAR在一个完全结构中是不可能的。2008年《经济计量学会》版权所有。
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement-that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question. Specifically, we formulate conditions of rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality (RmAR) and rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR). We show that (i) RCAR is characterized by a solution concept we call a "self-admissible set"; (ii) in a "complete" type structure, RmAR is characterized by the set of strategies that survive m+1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies; (iii) under certain conditions, RCAR is impossible in a complete structure. Copyright The Econometric Society 2008.