Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms
Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms
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首次公开募股公司的收购防御
DOI：
10.1111/0022-1082.00482
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jonathan M. Karpoff
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Field;Jonathan M. Karpoff
许多公司在上市时都部署了收购防御措施。当IPO经理人的薪酬高、持股少、非管理层股东的监督薄弱时，他们往往会采取防御措施。防御的存在与随后的收购可能性呈负相关，但对被收购公司的收购溢价没有影响。这些结果并不支持这样的论点，即收购防御有利于最终销售的IPO公司在高收购溢价。相反，他们建议管理层将收购保护的成本转移到非管理层股东身上。因此，代理问题甚至对处于IPO阶段的公司也很重要。美国金融协会2002年版权所有。
Many firms deploy takeover defenses when they go public. IPO managers tend to deploy defenses when their compensation is high, shareholdings are small, and oversight from nonmanagerial shareholders is weak. The presence of a defense is negatively related to subsequent acquisition likelihood, yet has no impact on takeover premiums for firms that are acquired. These results do not support arguments that takeover defenses facilitate the eventual sale of IPO firms at high takeover premiums. Rather, they suggest that managers shift the cost of takeover protection onto nonmanagerial shareholders. Thus, agency problems are important even for firms at the IPO stage. Copyright The American Finance Association 2002.