Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games
Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games
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具有正利润的自由进入均衡：数量和价格竞争博弈的统一方法
DOI：
10.1111/j.1742-7363.2007.00048.x
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Frédéric Dufourt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira;Frédéric Dufourt
自由进入均衡通常以零利润条件为特征。我们恳求，而不是严格的应用theNash equilibriumconcept的一个对称的同时进行的游戏，由实际和潜在的进入者，生产的平均成本下降。因此，均衡通常是不确定的，一些活跃的公司在盈利能力所要求的上限和可持续性所要求的下限之间变化。我们使用一个典型的模型与战略表示的价格，虽然覆盖标准制度的数量和价格竞争，表明在均衡的临界（利润最大化）价格必须位于盈亏平衡和极限价格之间。
Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a strict application of theNash equilibriumconcept to a symmetric simultaneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the break-even and the limit prices.