The hidden costs of control
The hidden costs of control
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.96.5.1611
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发表时间：
2006-12-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Kosfeld, Michael
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Falk, Armin;Kosfeld, Michael
我们在实验性委托代理博弈中分析了控制对动机的影响，其中委托人可以通过在代理人选择生产活动之前实现最低绩效要求来控制代理人。我们的研究结果表明，控制会带来隐性成本，因为大多数代理人会降低其绩效以应对委托人的控制决策。总体而言，控制权对委托人收益的影响是非单调的。当被问及他们对控制的情感感知时，大多数做出消极反应的代理人表示，他们将控制决策视为不信任的信号和对他们选择自主权的限制。
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principal-agent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principal's controlling decision. Overall, the effect of control on the principal's payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy.