Expropriation: Evidence from Rights Issues in China
Expropriation: Evidence from Rights Issues in China
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DOI：
10.2753/ree1540-496x440101
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发表时间：
2008-01
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Hongbo Pan;Xinping Xia;Minggui Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hongbo Pan;Xinping Xia;Minggui Yu
本文研究了我国股权分置改革中流通股股东的利益侵占问题。以1999 ~ 2004年444次配股为样本，我们发现流通股股东财富的变化与非流通股股东财富的变化呈负相关关系，这与侵占效应相一致。更多的证据表明，当公司最终不是由政府控制，非流通股股东不认购配股股份，或者公司有一个大的第二大股东时，配股的征用效应会加剧。
This paper examines the expropriation of tradable shareholders in rightsissuing firms with the split share structure in China. Using a sample of 444 rights issues from 1999 to 2004, we find that the change in wealth of tradable shareholders is negatively correlated with the change in wealth of nontradable shareholders, consistent with an expropriation effect. Additional evidence indicates that the expropriation effect in rights issues is exacerbated when the firm is not ultimately controlled by the government, the nontradable shareholders do not subscribe the shares of rights issues, or the firm has a large second-largest shareholder.