Market design for tradable mobility credits
Market design for tradable mobility credits
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DOI：
10.1016/j.trc.2023.104121
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发表时间：
2021-01
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Siyu Chen;Ravi Seshadri;C. L. Azevedo;A. Akkinepally;Renming Liu;Andrea Araldo;Yu Jiang;M. Ben-Aki
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文献类型：
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作者：
Siyu Chen;Ravi Seshadri;C. L. Azevedo;A. Akkinepally;Renming Liu;Andrea Araldo;Yu Jiang;M. Ben-Aki
可交易出行信用（TMC）计划是一种出行需求管理方法，近年来受到了广泛关注，被认为是缓解城市交通拥堵对环境、经济和社会的不利影响的一种有前途的手段。本文提出并分析了TMC系统的替代市场模型-侧重于市场设计方面，如分配/到期信用，交易规则，交易费用和监管干预-并开发了一种方法来明确建模市场内的个人的非聚集行为。针对早晨通勤问题，在一个组合模式和出发时间的背景下进行了大量的仿真实验，以比较相对于拥挤定价和无控制场景的替代设计的性能，结果表明，小的、固定的交易费用可以有效地抑制市场中的不良投机，而效率没有显着损失（总福利），而按比例收取交易费在效率和避免不必要的投机方面效果较差。此外，在连续时间内分配信用可以有利于处理非经常性事件和避免集中的交易活动。在存在收入效应的情况下，尽管有少量的固定交易费，TMC系统产生的社会福利略高于拥挤定价，同时实现收入中性。此外，由于市场的适应性，它在存在预测误差和非经常性事件的情况下更稳健。最后，正如预期的那样，TMC计划是更公平的（当拥挤收费的收入不重新分配时），虽然它不能保证是帕累托改进时，信用平均分配。
Tradable mobility credit (TMC) schemes are an approach to travel demand management that have received significant attention in recent years as a promising means to mitigate the adverse environmental, economic, and societal effects of urban traffic congestion. This paper proposes and analyzes alternative market models for a TMC system – focusing on market design aspects such as allocation/expiration of credits, rules governing trading, transaction fees, and regulator intervention – and develops a methodology to explicitly model the dis-aggregate behavior of individuals within the market. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted within a combined mode and departure-time context for the morning commute problem to compare the performance of the alternative designs relative to congestion pricing and a no-control scenario.The results indicate that small, fixed transaction fees can effectively mitigate undesirable speculation in the market without a significant loss in efficiency (total welfare) whereas proportional transaction fees are less effective, both in terms of efficiency and in avoiding undesirable speculation. Further, an allocation of credits in continuous time can be beneficial in dealing with non-recurrent events and avoiding concentrated trading activity. In the presence of income effects, despite small, fixed transaction fees, the TMC system yields a marginally higher social welfare than congestion pricing while attaining revenue neutrality. Moreover, it is more robust in the presence of forecasting errors and non-recurrent events due to the adaptiveness of the market. Finally, as expected, the TMC scheme is more equitable (when revenues from congestion pricing are not redistributed) although it is not guaranteed to be Pareto-improving when credits are distributed equally.