Dynamic matching market design
Dynamic matching market design
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DOI：
10.1145/2600057.2602887
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发表时间：
2014-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Akbarpour;Shengwu Li;S. Gharan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Akbarpour;Shengwu Li;S. Gharan
我们引入了网络市场中动态匹配的一个简单基准模型，在该模型中，参与者随机地到达和离开，并且参与者之间可接受交易的网络形成一个随机图。我们从三个角度分析我们的模型：等待时间、优化和信息。我们分析的主要见解是，等待市场变厚可能比提高交易速度重要得多，而且这对于存在等待成本的情况是相当稳健的。从优化的角度来看，选择合适时间匹配参与者但不利用全局网络结构的简单局部算法，其性能可以非常接近最优算法。从信息的角度来看，使用即使是关于参与者离开时间的部分信息的算法，其性能也比缺乏此类信息的算法好得多。信息和等待是互补的；关于离开时间的信息对于等待产生较大收益是必要的。为了获取参与者的离开时间，我们设计了一种无需转移支付的激励相容连续时间动态机制。链接：www.ssrn.com/abstract = 2394319
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions between agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three perspectives: waiting time, optimization, and information. The main insight of our analysis is that waiting to thicken the market can be substantially more important than increasing the speed of transactions, and this is quite robust to the presence of waiting costs. From an optimization perspective, naive local algorithms, that choose the right time to match agents but do not exploit global network structure, can perform very close to optimal algorithms. From an information perspective, algorithms that employ even partial information on agents' departure times perform substantially better than those that lack such information. Information and waiting are complements; information about departure times is necessary for waiting to yield large gains. To elicit agents' departure times, we design an incentive-compatible continuous-time dynamic mechanism without transfers. LINK: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2394319