UTILITARIAN PREFERENCES WITH MULTIPLE PRIORS
UTILITARIAN PREFERENCES WITH MULTIPLE PRIORS
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DOI：
10.3982/ecta12676
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发表时间：
2016-05-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Gayer, Gabi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alon, Shiri;Gayer, Gabi
本文提出了一种在不确定性环境下汇总个人偏好的方法。假设个体遵循萨维奇的主观期望效用模型，每个人都有自己的效用和主观概率。个人对概率的分歧会导致社会层面的不确定性，因此社会可能会接受一系列概率，而不仅仅是一个。我们假设社会偏好有一个最大期望效用表示。在这种情况下，两个帕累托型条件被证明是等价的，即社会效用是个人效用的加权平均值，而社会先验集只包含个人先验的加权平均值。因此，社会尊重个人信仰之间的共识，不会在信仰分歧之外增加歧义。我们还讨论了社会不排除任何个人信仰的情况。
This paper proposes a method for aggregating individual preferences in the context of uncertainty. Individuals are assumed to abide by Savage's model of Subjective Expected Utility, in which everyone has his/her own utility and subjective probability. Disagreement on probabilities among individuals gives rise to uncertainty at the societal level, and thus society may entertain a set of probabilities rather than only one. We assume that social preference admits a Maxmin Expected Utility representation. In this context, two Pareto-type conditions are shown to be equivalent to social utility being a weighted average of individual utilities and the social set of priors containing only weighted averages of individual priors. Thus, society respects consensus among individuals' beliefs and does not add ambiguity beyond disagreement on beliefs. We also deal with the case in which society does not rule out any individual belief.