Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems
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选举制度中的向心和离心激励
DOI：
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发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Cox
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Cox
本文探讨了选举法如何影响政党和候选人的立场选择动机。它试图将经典的“中间选民定理”中的发现扩展到广泛的选举系统，或者显示这种扩展的局限性。研究的因素包括地区的大小、选举模式、每名选民可投的票数、选民能否累积选票，以及选民能否“部分弃权”。“我建议将选举制度粗略地分为主要产生向心激励的制度和主要产生离心激励的制度。在产生向心激励的因素中，至少在非累积系统中，有以下几个：每个选民的选票数增加;“部分弃权”被宣布为非法;以及地区规模的减少。在允许累积投票的系统中，情况有点不同。
This paper investigates how electoral laws affect the position-taking incentives of parties and candidates. It seeks to extend the finding presented in the classical "median voter theorem" to a wide class of electoral systems-or to show the limits of such extension. The factors examined are the district magnitude, the electoral formula, the number of votes each voter is allowed to cast, whether voters can cumulate their votes, and whether voters can "partially abstain." I suggest a crude division of electoral systems into those producing predominantly centripetal incentives and those producing predominantly centrifugal incentives. Among the factors found to produce centripetal incentives, at least in noncumulative systems, are the following: increases in the number of votes per voter; outlawry of "partial abstention"; and decreases in the district magnitude. In systems allowing the cumulation of votes, matters are a bit different.