Distinction between Public and Private Life Marx on the zōon politikon
Distinction between Public and Private Life Marx on the zōon politikon
复制标题
公共生活与私人生活的区别 马克思论zōon politikon
DOI:
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发表时间:
1979
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
N. Schwartz
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
N. Schwartz
The political constitutions of liberal societies depend upon a distinction between the public and the private spheres of life, and they deem the preservation and enhancement of private life to be the goal of state action. Liberal political theorists see public life as the sphere of deliberation and coercion needed to protect private life, the sphere of spontaneous feeling and actions, “the pursuit of happiness.” Most nonliberal political theorists have also worked with some distinction between the public and private realms, although they define it along many different lines. Hegel, for example, departed from liberal theory in seeing the private as the sphere of material necessity as well as of spontaneity, and the public as the sphere of freedom in which deliberation and coercion were not felt as such because they were performed in the light of a higher public knowledge. Arendt, to take a modern case, differed from the classical liberals in arguing that many activities of voluntary association should be considered public rather than private in nature. So, too, the American Supreme Court, outlawing the “white primary” in the South, redefined a political party into a public body rather than a private club. It may be, as McConnell argues, that “[tlhe precise location of the distinction between what is private and what is public is much less important than its maintenance.”’