Monetary Cohabitation in Europe
Monetary Cohabitation in Europe
复制标题
欧洲的货币共存
DOI：
10.3386/w5532
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Tabellini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Persson;G. Tabellini
在欧洲货币联盟的第三阶段，货币政策如何在“内部”和“外部”之间协调？本文比较了可选择的制度机制，并得出结论，在欧洲水平上建立一个通用的通货膨胀目标体系有几个优点。它增强了国内货币政策的可信度。它排除了有意通过货币贬值获得竞争力的企图。它迫使货币政策自动对各种宏观经济冲击作出反应，从而稳定实际汇率。它在各国之间对称地分配这些冲击。在一个简单的政策协调理论模型的基础上，本文证明了通货膨胀目标体系近似于国际合作的最优政策。初步的经验证据支持这些理论结果。
How can monetary policy in stage III of European Monetary Union be coordinated between the `ins' and the `outs'? This paper compares alternative institutional mechanisms, and concludes that a generalized system of inflation targets at the European level has several merits. It strengthens domestic credibility of monetary policy. It rules out deliberate attempts to gain competitiveness through devaluations. It forces monetary policy to respond automatically to various macroeconomic shocks which is stabilizing for the real exchange rate. It distributes these shocks symmetrically across countries. On the basis of a simple theoretical model of policy coordination, the paper shows that a system of inflation targets approximates an optimal policy of international cooperation. Preliminary empirical evidence supports these theoretical results.