Two person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables
Two person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables
复制标题
具有两组策略变量的两人零和博弈
DOI：
10.1142/s0219198918500147
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
0.3
通讯作者：
Yasuhito Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Atsuhiro Satoh;Yasuhito Tanaka
我们考虑一个两人零和博弈，其中有两组通过可逆函数相关的策略变量。对于玩家 A 和 B，它们用 和 表示。玩家 A 的支付函数是。那么，玩家 B 的支付函数为：对于每个（或每个）为上半连续拟凹，对于每个（或每个）为上半连续拟凹，对于每个（或每个）为下半连续拟凸，对于每个（或每个）为下半连续拟凸。我们将证明以下四种竞争模式： (1) 玩家 A 和 B 选择并(竞争者)。(2) 玩家 A 和 B 选择并(竞争者)。(3) 玩家 A 和 B 选择并(竞争者)。(4) 玩家 A 和 B 选择并(竞争者)。
We consider a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables which are related by invertible functions. They are denoted byandfor players A and B. The payoff function of Player A is. Then, the payoff function of Player B is.is upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave onfor each(or each), upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave onfor each(or each), lower semi-continuous and quasi-convex onfor each(or each, and lower semi-continuous and quasi-convex onfor each(or each).We will show that the following four patterns of competition are equivalent, that is, they yield the same outcome.(1) Players A and B chooseand(competition by).(2) Players A and B chooseand(competition by).(3) Players A and B chooseand(competition by).(4) Players A and B chooseand(competition by).