Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China's Accounting‐Based Regulation of Rights Issues
Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China's Accounting‐Based Regulation of Rights Issues
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DOI：
10.2308/accr.2004.79.3.645
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发表时间：
2004-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kevin C. W. Chen;Hongqi Yuan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kevin C. W. Chen;Hongqi Yuan
从1996年到1998年，中国的上市公司被要求在前三年中每年达到10%的最低股本回报率（ROE），然后才能申请增发股票。由于这一规则，净资产收益率高度集中在略高于10%的地区。我们发现，中国监管机构似乎已经仔细审查了使用超额非营业收入达到10%门槛的公司。此外，随着时间的推移，它们这样做的能力似乎有所提高，这使它们能够更好地确定后来表现更好的公司。然而，许多公司仍然能够通过超额营业外收入获得配股批准。我们发现，这些公司随后的表现低于其他未使用相同做法的获准公司，这表明中国监管机构引导资本资源流向表现良好的行业的目标部分受到了盈余管理的影响。
From 1996 to 1998, listed companies in China were required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10 percent in each of the previous three years before they could apply for permission to issue additional shares. As a result of this rule, there was a heavy concentration of ROEs in the area just above 10 percent. We show that the Chinese regulators appear to have scrutinized firms using excess amounts of nonoperating income to reach the 10 percent hurdle. In addition, their ability to do so seems to have improved over time, which allows them to be better able to identify firms that subsequently performed better. However, many firms were still able to gain rights issue approval through excess nonoperating income. We show that these firms subsequently underperformed other approved firms that did not use the same practice, indicating that the Chinese regulators' objective of guiding capital resources toward the well‐performing sectors is partially compromised by earnings management.