The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote
The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote
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个人选票的供给和需求
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Stephen M. Swindle
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stephen M. Swindle
现有的理论认为，特殊行为和个人投票是同义词，这种活动的水平和性质是由个人候选人的激励所驱动的。在本文中，这两个假设都是有争议的，并提供了经验证据，表明特殊行为和个人投票是相当不同的，集体政党激励在决定个人投票的水平和性质方面可能同样重要。在个人候选人的激励和政党的激励之间存在直接冲突的情况下，情况尤其如此。为了确定这一点，比较了自1945年以来爱尔兰和日本的选举政治，以及选民无法在SNTV下转移选票如何从根本上改变了该系统中个人投票的水平和性质。
Existing theories assume that particularistic behavior and personal voting are synonymous, and that the level and nature of such activities are driven by the incentives of individual candidates. In this article, both of these assumptions are contested and empirical evidence is provided to suggest that particularistic behavior and personal voting are quite distinct, and that collective party incentives can be equally important in determining both the level and nature of personal voting. This is particularly true in settings where there is direct conflict between the incentives of individual candidates and the incentives of the party. To establish this, electoral politics in Ireland and Japan since 1945 are compared and also how the inability of voters to transfer votes under SNTV fundamentally altered the level and nature of personal voting in that system.