What Myth?

What Myth?
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什么神话?

DOI:
10.1080/00201740701489211
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
J. Mcdowell
J. Mcdowell
中科院分区:
人文科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Mcdowell

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在之前的工作中,我敦促我们理性动物享受的感知体验是由属于我们理性的能力决定的,顺便说一句,类似的东西也适用于我们的有意行为。休伯特·德莱弗斯在他的总统演讲中辩称,我因此接受了一个神话--“心灵的神话”。根据德莱弗斯的观点,我不能接受非反思性身体应对的现象学,以及它作为反思性智力活动中锻炼的概念能力的背景的重要性。我的论文回应了这一指控。德莱弗斯误解了我对亚里士多德的引用,并因此错误地认为,我认为理性是超然的,是从一个不同于沉浸其中的立场来处理实际困境的。我强烈要求,即使是理性的动物,即使是不加思考的肉体应对,也要受到它们的理性的启发。德莱弗斯提到了海德格尔的区别,伽达默尔注意到了这一区别,即面向世界和仅仅居住在一个环境中。但他把它放在一边,而这对我们之间的问题至关重要。积极的身体应对包括对负担的反应,而理性动物对负担的反应属于它们与世界的关系。我解释了概念能力在我们的知觉经验中实现的想法是如何与我们的知觉经验向世界打开我们的思想联系在一起的。最后,我认为,这一领域的真正神话是德莱弗斯对我的画进行抵制的合理性概念。
In previous work I urged that the perceptual experience we rational animals enjoy is informed by capacities that belong to our rationality, and—in passing—that something similar holds for our intentional action. In his Presidential Address, Hubert Dreyfus argued that I thereby embraced a myth, “the Myth of the Mental”. According to Dreyfus, I cannot accommodate the phenomenology of unreflective bodily coping, and its importance as a background for the conceptual capacities exercised in reflective intellectual activity. My paper responds to this accusation. Dreyfus misreads my invocation of Aristotle, and is thereby led to suppose, wrongly, that I conceive rationality as detached, brought to bear on practical predicaments from a standpoint other than one of immersion in them. I urge that even unreflective bodily coping, on the part of rational animals, is informed by their rationality. Dreyfus mentions Heidegger's distinction, which is picked up by Gadamer, between being oriented towards the world and merely inhabiting an environment. But he sets it aside, whereas it is crucial for the issue between us. Engaged bodily coping involves responsiveness to affordances, and responsiveness to affordances on the part of rational animals belongs to their relation to the world. I explain how the idea that conceptual capacities are actualized in our perceptual experience is connected with the thought that our perceptual experience opens us to the world. Finally, I suggest that the real myth in this area is the conception of rationality underlying Dreyfus's resistance to my picture.