Optimal choice of capacity, toll, and subsidy for build-operate -transfer roads with a paid minimum traffic guarantee
Optimal choice of capacity, toll, and subsidy for build-operate -transfer roads with a paid minimum traffic guarantee
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具有付费最低交通保证的建设-运营-转移道路的通行能力、通行费和补贴的最佳选择
DOI：
10.1016/j.tra.2020.06.023
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ke Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shasha Shi;Qingxian An;Ke Chen
政府部门经常在建设-运营-转让(BOT)道路上提供担保，以吸引私人投资。由于出具担保的或有负债会产生财政负担，因此在实践中，对担保收取费用被认为是管理或有负债的有效补救办法。在考虑最低交通保障收费机制的基础上，提出了一种基于最低交通保障收费的最优特许权合同变量选择方法。我们发现，政府部门将为付费MTG的BOT道路指定较低的通行费和较高的通行能力。因此，在提供有偿MTG时，社会遭受了社会福利损失。同时，MTG的收费和保证交通量都会增加社会福利的损失，这意味着私人参与的激励机制和或有负债的管理(MTG的收费)都是以牺牲社会福利为代价的。此外，由于福利损失在较高的边际社会成本条件下被放大，政府应该根据边际社会成本水平来确定收费和保证交通量。此外，为了获得更多的见解，本文做了两个扩展以进一步考察付费MTG的影响：(1)当与风险厌恶的私人投资者签约时；(2)当特许期是内生变量时。基于我们的模型结果，本文得出了当提供付费MTG时关于BOT合同设计的几个政策含义。
Government sectors often provide guarantees in build-operate-transfer (BOT) roads to attract private investments. Since a fiscal burden would be incurred from the contingent liability of issuing a guarantee, charging a fee for the guarantee is considered an effective remedy for management of contingent liabilities in practice. This study incorporates the charge mechanism for minimum traffic guarantee (MTG) into consideration, and proposes a method to choose the optimal concession contract variables with a paid MTG. We find that the government sector will specify a lower toll and a higher capacity for a BOT road with a paid MTG. As a result, the society suffers a social welfare loss when providing a paid MTG. Meanwhile, both the charging fee of an MTG and the guaranteed traffic volume would increase the loss of social welfare, which means the incentive mechanism of private participation and the management of contingent liabilities (charging fee for MTG) are all at the expense of social welfare. Moreover, since the welfare loss is magnified under a high marginal social cost condition, the government should set the charging fee and guaranteed traffic volume according to the marginal social cost level. In addition, to obtain more insights, this paper has made two extensions to further investigate the effects of a paid MTG (1) when contracting with a risk averse private investor; (2) when the concession period is an endogenous variable. Based on our model results, this paper derives several policy implications regarding BOT contract design when a paid MTG is provided.