Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain.
Coercion Changes the Sense of Agency in the Human Brain.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.067
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发表时间：
2016-03-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Haggard P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Caspar EA;Christensen JF;Cleeremans A;Haggard P
人们可能会否认其行为的负面后果，因为他们“遵守命令”。“纽伦堡辩护”提供了一个极端的例子，尽管这只是避免了米尔格拉姆的经典实验室研究。服从损害的指示，表明社会胁迫可能会改变志愿代理机制，因此取消了自己控制自己的行为的正常经验，但是，米尔格拉姆和其他研究依赖于散布和明确的机构衡量。我们在这里被社会规范有偏见。 。相对于参与者自由选择同样的危害的情况，强迫还减少了自己行动的结果的神经处理，那些遵守命令的人可能会比现在更接近被动行动我们的结果突出了产生自愿行动和社会结构（例如责任）主题的大脑机制之间的复杂关系。
行动责任是人类社会的关键特征
这取决于动作与大脑结果之间的关联
减少责任的主张有时基于“仅遵守命令”
两个实验表明，胁迫可以减少代理意识的隐式措施
在胁迫下的行动修改了作为行动的作者的经验，减少了动作和结果之间的临时关联。故意。
People may deny responsibility for negative consequences of their actions by claiming that they were “only obeying orders.” The “Nuremberg defense” offers one extreme example, though it is often dismissed as merely an attempt to avoid responsibility. Milgram’s classic laboratory studies reported widespread obedience to an instruction to harm, suggesting that social coercion may alter mechanisms of voluntary agency, and hence abolish the normal experience of being in control of one’s own actions. However, Milgram’s and other studies relied on dissembling and on explicit measures of agency, which are known to be biased by social norms. Here, we combined coercive instructions to administer harm to a co-participant, with implicit measures of sense of agency, based on perceived compression of time intervals between voluntary actions and their outcomes, and with electrophysiological recordings. In two experiments, an experimenter ordered a volunteer to make a key-press action that caused either financial penalty or demonstrably painful electric shock to their co-participant, thereby increasing their own financial gain. Coercion increased the perceived interval between action and outcome, relative to a situation where participants freely chose to inflict the same harms. Interestingly, coercion also reduced the neural processing of the outcomes of one’s own action. Thus, people who obey orders may subjectively experience their actions as closer to passive movements than fully voluntary actions. Our results highlight the complex relation between the brain mechanisms that generate the subjective experience of voluntary actions and social constructs, such as responsibility. Responsibility for action is a key feature of human societies It depends on association between actions and outcomes in the brain Claims of reduced responsibility are sometimes based on “only obeying orders” Two experiments suggest coercion can reduce implicit measures of sense of agency Acting under coercion modifies the subjective experience of being the author of an action, reducing the perceived temporal association between actions and outcomes. Caspar et al. show that the neural processing of action outcomes under coercion more closely resembles situations of passive movement than actions carried out intentionally.