Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA
Corporate Leniency Programs in the EU and the USA
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欧盟和美国的企业宽大计划
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.384740
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Feess
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Walzl;E. Feess
我们开发了一个模型来分析和比较欧盟和美国的公司宽大处理项目。这两个项目都基于这样一种理念，即团队成员之间的战略互动可以通过对自我报告公司的慷慨，来增加预期的罚款。这与关于单个违规者的自我报告计划的知名文献形成鲜明对比，在这些计划中，从轻发落永远不会导致更高的预期罚款。虽然这两个程序有一些共同的特点，但也有重要的区别。为了研究这些差异，我们引入了一个具有两个自我报告阶段的模型，即关于所提供证据数量的异质类型和事后不对称信息。
We develop a model to analyze and to compare the corporate leniency programs in the EU and the USA. Both programs are based on the idea that strategic interactions between the team members can be used to increase expected fines by being generous to self-reporting firms. This is in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on self-reporting schemes with single violators where leniency can never lead to higher expected fines. Although the two programs share some common features, there are also important differences. To investigate these differences we introduce a model with two self-reporting stages, heterogenous types with respect to the amount of evidence provided, and ex post asymmetric information.