Presidents and Patronage
Presidents and Patronage
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总统和赞助
DOI：
10.1111/ajps.12083
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David E. Lewis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gary E. Hollibaugh;Gabriel Horton;David E. Lewis
总统在多大程度上是根据竞选经验和关系来选择被任命者的？这个问题的答案对我们理解总统管理和政治领导力具有重要意义。本文提出了一个理论，解释总统在哪里放置不同类型的被任命者，为什么，重点是在意识形态，能力和非政策的赞助利益之间的潜在任命的差异。我们开发了一个正式的模型，并测试其含义与新的数据在奥巴马政府的前六个月任命的1,307人。实证结果广泛支持的理论，这表明，总统奥巴马更有可能把任命的非政策赞助的原因，在他的议程机构，在机构，分享他的政策观点，被任命者是最不能影响机构的表现。我们的结论是，赞助继续在美国政治中发挥重要作用，竞选，总统政治和治理的重要后果。
To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non-policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non-policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.
(±)-γ-红溴霉素的全合成
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
北泰行;他
通讯作者：
他