The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private
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DOI：
10.1257/mic.20160304
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发表时间：
2019-02-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Frechette, Guillaume R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Aoyagi, Masaki;Bhaskar, V.;Frechette, Guillaume R.
本文通过实验室实验研究了监控结构对无限重复囚徒困境博弈的影响。在保持阶段博弈的策略形式不变的情况下，我们研究了关于过去行为的信息是完美的（完美监控）、嘈杂但公开的（公共监控）和嘈杂但私密的（私人监控）时受试者的行为。我们发现被试在每个治疗中都保持合作，但他们的策略在三种治疗中有所不同。具体而言，不完全监控下的策略比完全监控下的策略更复杂，也更宽松。结果表明，监测结构策略的变化如何减轻监测噪声对效率的影响。
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the three treatments. Specifically, the strategies under imperfect monitoring are both more complex and more lenient than those under perfect monitoring. The results show how the changes in strategies across monitoring structures mitigate the effect of noise in monitoring on efficiency.