Response to Martin K. Dimitrov’s Review of Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism
Response to Martin K. Dimitrov’s Review of Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism
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对马丁·季米特洛夫《革命与独裁统治的评论：持久威权主义的暴力起源》的回应
作者：
Lucan Way
20 世纪 90 年代（第 337-41 页）。这两个例子很重要，不仅因为它们表明社会革命并不是绝迹的历史现象，而且因为它们展示了冷战与冷战后革命独裁政权之间的重要区别。卢旺达和厄立特里亚都被证明是持久的，尽管两者都没有发展出精英凝聚力支柱，而在古巴、越南或阿尔巴尼亚等政权所展现的理想典型的激进革命情景中，精英凝聚力被认为对于政权的持久性至关重要。作者提出的一个将刺激未来研究的难题是冷战后社会革命中出现的政权与二十世纪早期建立的政权有何不同。如此广泛的一本书值得进一步的学术反思。出现的一个问题涉及关于威权持久性三大支柱的争论的范围条件。正如作者明确指出的，这些支柱仅在所分析的 20 个革命政权的一部分中得到充分发展。通过第 2 至第 8 章的深入案例研究确定了四个这样的政权（苏联、中国、越南和古巴），而另外两个政权则在最后的第 9 章中讨论：阿尔巴尼亚和令人惊讶的安哥拉，根据作者的说法，安哥拉人民解放运动消除了所有有组织的反对派（第 335 页）——尽管有些人可能会质疑这与安盟今天控制着安哥拉国民议会 40% 以上席位的事实是否相符。这六个政权是唯一在持久威权主义三大支柱的发展方面得分为 3 分（满分 3 分）的政权：精英凝聚力、强大而忠诚的强制机构以及独立权力中心的破坏（第 319、342 页）。这些政权的共同点是，其中五个无疑是共产主义政权（苏联、中国、越南、古巴和阿尔巴尼亚），而第六个政权（安哥拉）被许多学者认为是共产主义政权（尽管我将其置于共产主义半影中，这一类别包括仅部分属于共产主义政权的政权）。这表明共产主义革命政权在充分发展威权持久性的三大支柱方面可能比非共产主义革命政权具有优势。关注共产主义政权使我们能够有效地扩展本书中提出的论点。按照惯例，作者将 13 个政权排除在分析之外，因为它们处于“外国控制”之下（第 394-408 页）。其中九个政权是共产主义政权：其中三个通常被理解为革命政权（蒙古、朝鲜和老挝），六个通常被标记为非革命政权（保加利亚、捷克斯洛伐克、德意志民主共和国、匈牙利[1947-1990]、波兰和罗马尼亚）。尽管正如书中反复指出的那样，在古巴、越南和安哥拉等分析中的政权中可以发现外国控制或至少影响的证据，但公约仍应受到尊重；我们还可以补充一点，直到20世纪50年代末，中国都得到了苏联的大量援助，而阿尔巴尼亚在中苏分裂后的最初十年中经历了一段与中国密切联系的时期。很少有政权可以被称为真正独立，尤其是在冷战地缘政治竞争加剧时期。我认为，如果将蒙古、朝鲜和老挝纳入分析，将会产生更多的革命共产主义案例，其中持久威权主义的三大支柱得到充分发展。此外，如果将这六个非革命案例包括在内，就会揭示威权持久性三大支柱的充分发展并不仅限于共产主义革命政权的子集，而且也可以在大多数非革命共产主义政权中找到（除了波兰，其独立权力中心在共产主义期间没有被摧毁）。因此，尽管研究中纳入像加纳（1957-66）这样的非革命非共产主义政权表明它没有发展出持久威权主义的三大支柱，但学者们可能想知道，对六个非革命东欧共产主义政权（与加纳不同，它们非常持久）的深入分析是否可能产生关于共产主义统治（无论是否革命）对三大支柱以及政权持久性的增强作用的富有成效的论据。这些探究路线可以被未来的学术研究所采用。这是一项令人印象深刻的研究，浓缩了两位杰出作者的专业知识。广大社会科学家，尤其是政治学家、社会学家和历史学家都会对此感兴趣。研究威权政治的学生将会欢迎它关于革命起源和政权持久性的见解。这本书还将实现只有少数研究才能实现的目标：它将在未来很长一段时间内刺激研究。
in the 1990s (pp. 337–41). These two examples are important not only because they demonstrate that social revolutions are not extinct historical phenomena but also because they showcase important differences between ColdWar and post–ColdWar revolutionary dictatorships. Both Rwanda and Eritrea have proven to be durable although neither has developed the elite cohesion pillar, which is deemed essential for regime durability in the ideal-typical radical revolutionary scenario that unfolded in regimes like Cuba, Vietnam, or Albania. A puzzle raised by the authors that will stimulate future research is how regimes that emerge from social revolutions after the Cold War differ from those established earlier in the twentieth century. A book of this breadth invites further scholarly reflection. One question that arises concerns the scope conditions for the argument about the three pillars of authoritarian durability. As the authors make clear, these pillars develop fully only in a subset of the 20 revolutionary regimes analyzed. Four such regimes are identified through the in-depth case studies presented in chapters 2–8 (the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Cuba), whereas another two are discussed in the concluding chapter 9: Albania and, surprisingly, Angola, where according to the authors the MPLA eliminated all organized opposition (p. 335)—although some might question how that squares with the fact that UNITA today controls more than 40% of the seats in the Angolan National Assembly. These six regimes are the only ones that score 3 out of 3 on the development of the three pillars of durable authoritarianism: elite cohesion, a strong and loyal coercive apparatus, and the destruction of independent power centers (pp. 319, 342). What these regimes have in common is that five are unquestionably communist (the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Albania) and the sixth (Angola) is considered by many scholars to have been communist (though I would place it in the communist penumbra, a category that includes regimes that belong only partially to the communist set). This suggests that communist revolutionary regimes may possess an advantage over noncommunist revolutionary regimes in fully developing the three pillars of authoritarian durability. Focusing on communist regimes allows us to productively extend the argument presented in this book. Following convention, the authors exclude 13 regimes from the analysis because they were under “foreign control” (pp. 394–408). Nine of those regimes are communist: three of these are conventionally understood as revolutionary (Mongolia, North Korea, and Laos), and six are usually labeled nonrevolutionary (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary [1947– 1990], Poland, and Romania). Conventions are to be respected, although as the book repeatedly indicates, evidence of foreign control or at least influence can be detected in regimes that are included in the analysis, such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola; we might also add that China experienced substantial Soviet assistance until the late 1950s and that Albania underwent a period of close links with China in the initial decade after the Sino–Soviet split. Few regimes can be described as truly independent, especially during the period of heightened Cold War geopolitical rivalry. I feel that the inclusion of Mongolia, North Korea, and Laos in the analysis would have produced additional revolutionary communist cases in which the three pillars of durable authoritarianism are fully developed. Moreover, had the six nonrevolutionary cases been included, this would have revealed that the full development of the three pillars of authoritarian durability is not limited simply to the subset of communist revolutionary regimes but can also be found in most of the nonrevolutionary communist regimes (except Poland, where independent power centers were not destroyed during communism). Thus, although the inclusion of a nonrevolutionary noncommunist regime like Ghana (1957–66) in the study shows that it did not develop the three pillars of durable authoritarianism, scholars might wonder whether an in-depth analysis of the six nonrevolutionary Eastern European communist regimes (which, unlike Ghana, were very durable) might generate productive arguments regarding the reinforcing effects of communist rule, be it revolutionary or not, on the three pillars and by extension on regime durability. These lines of inquiry can be taken up by future scholarship. This is an impressive study that distills the expertise of its two distinguished authors. It will be of interest to a broad audience of social scientists, especially political scientists, sociologists, and historians. Students of authoritarian politics will welcome its insights about revolutionary origins and regime durability. The book will also do what only a handful of studies achieve: it will stimulate research for a long time to come.