On information, extended liability and judgment proof firms
On information, extended liability and judgment proof firms
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关于信息、延伸责任和判断证明公司
DOI：
10.1007/s10018-011-0023-1
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Anyangah
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Anyangah
我们使用一个具有内生筛选的简单借贷模型来比较获取信息成本的改善和贷款人对借款人造成的环境损害的责任的增加所产生的影响。在该模型中，判断证明借款人拥有关于其潜在风险（由事故概率表示）的私人信息。筛选使贷款人能够事先收到关于借款人风险类型的嘈杂信号。我们表明，信息成本的下降加剧了信贷配给。相比之下，贷款人负债的增加导致信贷配给程度的降低。对社会福利的影响在很大程度上取决于人口中借款人类型的组合：如果人口中有大量优秀的借款人，延长负债的增加可能会改善社会福利；如果良好风险的比例足够低，信息系统的改进可能会提高社会福利。
We use a simple lending model with endogenous screening to compare the impact of improvements in the cost of acquiring information and increases in the liability of lenders for environmental harm caused by their borrowers. In the model, judgment proof borrowers have private information about their underlying risk (represented by the probability of an accident). Screening enables lenders to receive a noisy signal about their borrowers’ risk type ex ante. We show that a decrease in the cost of information exacerbates credit rationing. By contrast, an increase in lender liability leads to a reduction in the extent to which credit is rationed. The impact on social welfare crucially depends on the mix of borrower-type in the population: an increase in extended liability is likely to improve social welfare if there is an abundance of good borrowers in the population; improvements in the information system are likely to enhance social welfare if the proportion of good risks is sufficiently low.