Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition
Prices versus quantities: environmental regulation and imperfect competition
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价格与数量：环境监管和不完全竞争
DOI：
10.1007/s11149-013-9219-6
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
E. Mansur
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Mansur
通过行使市场力量，一家公司将扭曲市场上所有公司的生产，从而扭曲其排放决策。本文考察了战略行为的福利含义如何取决于污染是如何受到监管的。在排放税下，总排放量不会影响污染的边际成本。相比之下，可交易许可证的价格是内生的。我展示了这种反馈效应何时会增加战略企业的产出。相对于税收，在一个不完全竞争的市场中，可交易的许可证可能会改善福利。作为应用，我对大西洋中部电力市场中批发商的战略和竞争行为进行了建模。模拟表明，行使市场支配力减少了当地的排放，从而大幅降低了区域可交易许可价格。此外，我发现，如果监管者选择使用税收而不是许可证，不完全竞争造成的无谓损失可能会更大。
By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and therefore the emissions decisions, of all firms in the market. This paper examines how the welfare implications of strategic behavior depend on how pollution is regulated. Under an emissions tax, aggregate emissions do not affect the marginal cost of polluting. In contrast, the price of tradable permits is endogenous. I show when this feedback effect increases strategic firms’ output. Relative to a tax, tradable permits may improve welfare in a market with imperfect competition. As an application, I model strategic and competitive behavior of wholesalers in a Mid-Atlantic electricity market. Simulations suggest that exercising market power decreased emissions locally, thereby substantially reducing the regional tradable permit price. Furthermore, I find that had regulators opted to use a tax instead of permits, the deadweight loss from imperfect competition would have been even greater.