NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE ROLE OF INFORMATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN RETIREMENT PLAN DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE ROLE OF INFORMATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN RETIREMENT PLAN DECISIONS: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT
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发表时间:
2002
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通讯作者:
E. Duflo;Emmanuel Saez
E. Duflo;Emmanuel Saez
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其他
文献类型:
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作者:
E. Duflo;Emmanuel Saez

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本文分析了一项随机实验,以揭示信息和社交互动在员工决定参加大型大学内的递延纳税账户(TDA)退休计划中的作用。该实验鼓励随机抽取的一部分部门的员工参加由大学组织的福利信息博览会,并承诺对出席者给予金钱奖励。该实验使这些接受治疗的人的出勤率增加了两倍多(相对于对照组),并使一些接受治疗的部门内未接受治疗的人的出勤率增加了一倍。公平后5个月和11个月的TDA入学率在一些个人接受治疗的部门明显高于没有人接受治疗的部门。然而,对TDA注册的影响几乎是一样大的个人在治疗部门谁没有收到的鼓励,为那些谁。我们提供了三种解释,差别待遇效应,社会网络效应和激励奖励效应,以解释这些结果。Esther Duflo Emmanuel Saez麻省理工学院哈佛大学经济系经济系剑桥,MA 02142剑桥,MA 02138和国家经济研究局和国家经济研究局eduflo@mit.edu saez@fas.harvard.edu
This paper analyzes a randomized experiment to shed light on the role of information and social interactions in employees' decisions to enroll in a Tax Deferred Account (TDA) retirement plan within a large university. The experiment encouraged a random sample of employees in a subset of departments to attend a benefits information fair organized by the university, by promising a monetary reward for attendance. The experiment more than tripled the attendance rate of these treated individuals (relative to controls), and doubled that of untreated individuals within departments where some individuals were treated. TDA enrollment 5 and 11 months after the fair was significantly higher in departments where some individuals were treated than in departments where nobody was treated. However, the effect on TDA enrollment is almost as large for individuals in treated departments who did not receive the encouragement as for those who did. We provide three interpretations, differential treatment effects, social network effects, and motivational reward effects, to account for these results. Esther Duflo Emmanuel Saez MIT Harvard University Department of Economics Department of Economics Cambridge, MA 02142 Cambridge, MA 02138 and NBER and NBER eduflo@mit.edu saez@fas.harvard.edu