Social security and strategic inter-vivos transfers of social capital
Social security and strategic inter-vivos transfers of social capital
复制标题
社会保障与社会资本体内战略性转移
DOI：
10.1007/bf00185256
复制
发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Kai A. Konrad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kai A. Konrad
本文在不考虑遗赠动机的情况下，通过一个包含“老人统治”的代际交叠模型来解释社会资本的公共供给。老一代人有提供教育和基础设施的动机，因为这些商品改变了社会保障税的拉弗曲线，从而增加了政治均衡中的老年收入。如果人口增长更大，这种激励就更强。政治均衡中的社会资本边际生产率可能超过或低于有效配置中的社会资本边际生产率。
This paper explains public provision of social capital in an overlapping generations model with ‘gerontocracy’, without resort to any bequest motive. The old generation has an incentive to provide education and infrastructure because these goods shift the Laffer curve of social security taxation, thereby increasing old-age income in the political equilibrium. The incentive is stronger if population growth is larger. The marginal productivity of social capital in the political equilibrium may exceed or fall short of the marginal productivity of social capital in an efficient allocation.