Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
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DOI：
10.1007/s10058-015-0169-6
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发表时间：
2015-03
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Takeshi Nishimura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takeshi Nishimura
本文研究了公共采购和私人采购中的计分拍卖的最优设计。在这次拍卖中，每个供应商的报价都包括价格和质量，报价达到最高分的供应商获胜。我们考虑的环境具有质量是多维的特征，质量属性之间的成本互补性或成本可替代性显著影响实施买方最优机制的评分规则的形成。我们的结果表明，如果质量属性之间的成本替代度是非正的，则最优评分规则在质量属性中是可加可分的，而当程度足够高时，最优评分规则不能是可加可分的。一个例子说明了如何使用可加可分的评分规则来计算买家的损失。我们还考察了最优评分规则如何依赖于买方权重参数对供应商利润和供应商数量的影响。
This article studies the optimal design of scoring auctions used in public and private procurement. In this auction, each supplier’s offer consists of both price and quality, and a supplier whose offer achieves the highest score wins. The environment we consider has the feature that quality is multidimensional, and the cost complementarity or cost substitutability among quality attributes significantly affects the form of a scoring rule which implements the buyer’s optimal mechanism. Our results show that the optimal scoring rule can be additively separable in the quality attributes if the degree of cost substitutability between the attributes is nonpositive, and it cannot be additively separable if the degree is sufficiently high. An example shows how to compute the buyer’s loss from using an additively separable scoring rule. We also investigate how the optimal scoring rule depends on the buyer’s weight parameter on suppliers’ profits and the number of suppliers.