The political economy of FDI location : why don't political checks and balances and treaty constraints matter?
The political economy of FDI location : why don't political checks and balances and treaty constraints matter?
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FDI 所在地的政治经济学：为什么政治制衡和条约约束不重要？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Walter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Walter
虽然自1970年代以来，外国直接投资被征用的风险已大大降低，但政治风险仍然是许多国家的跨国公司所关注的问题。我问的是，旨在保护FDI的国内政治制衡和国际法律的文书是否能使政府明智地承诺避免未来采取减少FDI沉没价值的政策。利用数据集上的外国活动的水平，由多数拥有的美国制造业子公司的国家和行业在1982年至1998年，我没有发现任何证据表明，这两种机制鼓励内向外国直接投资。然而，社会政治稳定和中间派/技术官僚政府确实向外国投资者发出了积极的信号，高效的国内法律的制度也是如此。一般来说，跨国公司也采取各种应对战略，以减轻政治和政策风险，即使是在没有制衡和投资条约承诺的国家。
Although the risk of expropriation for foreign direct investment (FDI) has fallen substantially since the 1970s, political risk continues to be of concern to MNCs in many countries. I ask whether domestic political checks and balances and international legal instruments that aim to protect FDI enable governments to commit credibly to avoid future policies that diminish the value of sunk FDI. Utilizing a dataset on the level of foreign activity by majority-owned US manufacturing affiliates by country and industry over 1982-98, I find no evidence that either mechanism encourages inward FDI. Socio-political stability and centrist/technocratic governments do, however, provide positive signals to foreign investors, as may efficient domestic legal systems. Generally, MNCs also pursue various coping strategies that mitigate political and policy risk even in countries with few checks and balances and without investment treaty commitments.