Trust and verification: balancing agency and stewardship theory in the governance of agencies
Trust and verification: balancing agency and stewardship theory in the governance of agencies
复制标题
信任与验证：代理机构治理中的平衡代理与管理理论
DOI：
10.1080/10967494.2018.1553807
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Karl Hagen Bjurstrøm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thomas Schillemans;Karl Hagen Bjurstrøm
摘要 许多政府服务由（部分）自治机构提供。政府需要采取有效措施来签约、指导和监督机构，并平衡控制和信任。在文献中，基于控制的代理理论和基于信任的管理理论经常被描述为替代和竞争的方法。然而，在公共行政的实证研究中，这些方法常常发现混合和矛盾的结果。在此背景下，本文分析了明确建立在代理和管理理论基础上的基于信任和控制的方法的结合如何有助于解释参与者何时对给定的治理制度感到最满意。开发了一种调查工具，首次结合代理理论全面衡量了管理理论的丰富概念。对荷兰机构治理的分析表明，政府确实结合了两个理论阵营的治理解决方案，并阐明了在什么条件下这种组合最令人满意。
ABSTRACT Many government services are delivered by (partially) autonomous agencies. Governments need effective measures for contracting, steering, and monitoring agencies and to balance control and trust. In the literature, control-based agency theory and trust-based stewardship theory have often been portrayed as alternative and competing approaches. In empirical studies in public administration, however, these approaches often find mixed and contradictory results. Against this background, this article analyzes how a combination of trust- and control-based approaches, explicitly founded on agency and stewardship theory, can help explain when participants find a given governance regime to be most satisfactory. A survey instrument is developed which, for the first time, fully measures the rich concept of stewardship theory in conjunction with agency theory. The analysis of the governance of Dutch agencies shows that government indeed combines governance solutions from both theoretical camps and illuminates under which conditions this combination is most satisfactory.