Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Performance
Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Performance
复制标题
财政分权和财政绩效
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Anwar Shah
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anwar Shah
最近对财政联邦制的兴趣重新抬头，这是宏观经济稳定专家的一个关切。他们认为，分散的财政制度对宏观经济稳定构成威胁，因为它与审慎的货币和财政管理不相容。作者通过一个简单的新制度经济学和计量经济学分析的视角来解决这些问题。他的分析得出结论认为，与普遍的误解相反，财政分权与财政绩效的改善和内部共同市场的更好运作有关。财政政策协调是联邦系统面临的一项重要挑战。在这方面，财政规则和机构提供了一个有用的框架，但不一定是应对这一挑战的解决办法。对所有各级都有约束力的财政规则有助于在执政联盟或分散政权的国家维持政治承诺。协调机构有助于利用道德支持来鼓励协调一致的反应。工业化国家的经验还表明，单方面对国家以下各级政府施加联邦控制和限制通常是行不通的。相反，基于财政保守主义的社会规范，如瑞士公民投票和选民的政治行动主义，发挥了重要作用。最终，资本市场和债券评级机构对财政政策提供了更有效的约束。在这种情况下，重要的是不要支持国家和地方债务，也不要允许任何级别的政府拥有银行。预算过程和机构的透明度、对选民的问责制以及可普遍获得的比较数据有助于财政纪律。财政权力下放给宏观经济管理带来重大挑战。这些挑战要求仔细设计货币和财政制度，以克服与“共同财产“资源管理问题或寻租行为有关的不利激励。联邦国家的经验表明，财政制度需要大量学习和调整，以创造符合公平竞争的激励措施，并克服合同不完整的问题。这就解释了为什么在货币和财政政策管理以及透明和负责任的治理的大多数方面，分散的财政制度似乎比集中的财政制度做得更好。
A resurgence of recent interest in fiscal federalism has been a source of concern among macroeconomic stabilization experts. They argue that a decentralized fiscal system poses a threat to macroeconomic stability as it is incompatible with prudent monetary and fiscal management. The author addresses these concerns by taking a simple neo-institutional economics with an econometric analysis perspective. His analysis concludes that, contrary to a common misconception, fiscal decentralization is associated with improved fiscal performance and better functioning of internal common markets. Fiscal policy coordination represents an important challenge for federal systems. In this context, fiscal rules and institutions provide a useful framework but not necessarily a solution to this challenge. Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response. Industrial countries'experiences also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on subnational governments typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal conservatism such as the Swiss referenda and political activism of the electorate play important roles. Ultimately capital markets and bond-rating agencies provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is important not to backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any level of government. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, accountability to the electorate, and general availability of comparative data encourages fiscal discipline. Fiscal decentralization poses significant challenges for macroeconomic management. These challenges require careful design of monetary and fiscal institutions to overcome adverse incentives associated with the"common property"resource management problems or with rent seeking behavior. Experiences of federal countries indicate significant learning and adaptation of fiscal systems to create incentives compatible with fair play and to overcome incomplete contracts. This explains why that decentralized fiscal systems appear to do better than centralized fiscal systems on most aspects of monetary and fiscal policy management and transparent and accountable governance.