Centralization versus Decentralization: An Application to Price Setting by a Multi-Market Firm. ∗
Centralization versus Decentralization: An Application to Price Setting by a Multi-Market Firm. ∗
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集中化与分散化：多市场公司定价的应用*。
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Niko Matouschek
中科院分区：
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作者：
Ricardo Alonso;Wouter Dessein;Niko Matouschek
本文比较了在两个市场上销售单一产品，但受限于一个价格(例如，由于套利)的企业的集中式和分散式定价。每个市场的特点是不同的线性需求函数，需求状况由当地管理者私下观察。这位经理只关心自己市场的利润，因此，他会战略性地传达自己的信息。我们的主要结果是将组织设计与市场需求联系起来。首先，如果定价是分散的，它总是被委托给面临最平坦的反向需求函数的管理者，而不考虑市场需求的大小。其次，即使定价可以分配给一个不偏不倚的总部，当市场在反向需求函数的平坦程度上存在足够大的差异时，权力下放也是最优的。最后，当当地管理者在价格问题上存在更多分歧时，权力下放的可能性更大。(JEL：D23、D83、L23)(C)2008年，欧洲经济协会。
This paper compares centralized and decentralized price setting by a firm that sells a single product in two markets, but is constrained to set one price (e.g., due to arbitrage). Each market is characterized by a different linear demand function, and demand conditions are privately observed by a local manager. This manager only cares about profits in his own market and, as a result, communicates his information strategically. Our main results link organizational design to market demand. First, if pricing is decentralized, it is always delegated to the manager who faces the flattest inverse demand function, regardless of the size of market demand. Second, even when pricing can be allocated to an unbiased headquarters, decentralization is optimal when markets differ sufficiently in how flat the inverse demand functions are. Finally, decentralization is more likely when, in expectations, local managers disagree more about prices. (JEL: D23, D83, L23) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.