Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance in Brazil
Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance in Brazil
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非正规劳动力和社会计划的效率成本：来自巴西失业保险的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gustavo M. Gonzaga
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Gérard;Gustavo M. Gonzaga
人们普遍认为，大型非正规部门的存在增加了发展中国家社会方案的效率成本。我们通过将最优失业保险框架与巴西的综合数据相结合来评估失业保险(UI)情况下的此类索赔。通过对潜在失业持续时间的准实验变化，我们发现了常见的道德风险问题的明确证据，即失业会降低重返正式工作的动机。然而，相关的效率成本低于美国，在巴西非正规性较高的劳动力市场，这一成本更低。这是因为在非正式程度较高的地方，正式的再就业率一开始就较低，因此更大比例的工人将在没有任何道德风险的情况下领取UI福利。总而言之，随着经济的正规化，对效率的担忧实际上可能会变得更加相关。(Jel J65、O15、O17、E26、D82、J46)
It is widely believed that the presence of a large informal sector increases the efficiency cost of social programs in developing countries. We evaluate such claims for the case of unemployment insurance (UI) by combining an optimal UI framework with comprehensive data from Brazil. Using quasi-experimental variation in potential UI duration, we find clear evidence for the usual moral hazard problem that UI reduces incentives to return to a formal job. Yet, the associated efficiency cost is lower than it is in the United States, and it is lower in labor markets with higher informality within Brazil. This is because formal reemployment rates are lower to begin with where informality is higher, so that a larger share of workers would draw UI benefits absent any moral hazard. In sum, efficiency concerns may actually become more relevant as an economy formalizes. (JEL J65, O15, O17, E26, D82, J46)