THEORY OF MARRIAGE .1.
THEORY OF MARRIAGE .1.
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DOI：
10.1086/260084
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发表时间：
1973-01-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
BECKER, GS
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
BECKER, GS
我在这篇论文中提出了一个婚姻理论的框架。两个基本假设是，每个人都尽可能做得好，“婚姻市场”处于平衡状态。在几个额外的简化假设的帮助下，我得出了一些关于这个市场行为的重要含义。例如，一个男人和一个女人从结婚中获得的收益与保持单身相比，正取决于他们的收入，人力资本和工资率的相对差异。该理论还暗示，在物质资本、教育或智力（除了对工资率的影响）、身高、种族或许多其他特征方面存在差异的男性，往往会与具有相似价值观的女性结婚，而在工资率或在家庭生产中具有密切替代作用的男性和女性的特征方面，配偶之间的相关性往往是负面的。该理论并不认为配偶之间的产出分配是既定的，而是从婚姻市场均衡的本质中推导出来的。和其他市场一样，这里的分工是由边际生产率决定的，而边际生产率又受到不同人的人力资本和物质资本、性别比例（即男女的相对数量）以及其他一些变量的影响。
I present in this paper the skeleton of a theory of marriage. The two basic assumptions are that each person tries to do as well as possible and that the "marriage market" is in equilibrium. With the aid of several additional simplifying assumptions, I derive a number of significant implications about behavior in this market. For example, the gain to a man and woman from marrying compared to remaining single is shown to depend positively on their incomes, human capital, and relative difference in wage rates. The theory also implies that men differing in physical capital, education or intelligence (aside from their effects on wage rates), height, race, or many other traits will tend to marry women with like values of these traits, whereas the correlation between mates for wage rates or for traits of men and women that are close substitutes in household production will tend to be negative. The theory does not take the division of output between mates as given, but rather derives it from the nature of the marriage market equilibrium. The division is determined here, as in other markets, by marginal productivities, and these are affected by the human and physical capital of different persons, sex ratios (that is, the relative numbers of men and women), and some other variables.