Collective Intentionality
Collective Intentionality
复制标题
集体意向性
作者：
M. Janković;K. Ludwig
集体意向性是指群体或集体的意向性。意向性是关于、指向、定向或代表对象、事件、属性和事件状态的属性。故意状态的例子有信仰、欲望、希望、意图、钦佩、知觉、内疚、爱、悲伤、恐惧等等。集体意向性涉及共同、共享或群体意向，以及具有共同或共享态度的群体成员(作为成员)的意向性。更广泛地说，对集体意向性的研究涉及支撑社会现实的意向性的形式。在更广泛的社会互动和结构研究中对集体意向性的研究的独特之处在于，它侧重于共同或共享的行动和态度的概念、本体论和心理特征，即，群体或集体的行动和态度(或这种行为和态度的明显归属)，它们与个人行动和态度的关系，以及它们对社会群体的性质和功能的影响。它包括集体行动、意图、思想、推理、情感、现象学、决策、责任、知识、信任、理性、合作、竞争和相关问题，以及这些问题如何支撑社会实践、惯例、制度和社会本体论。集体意向性研究中的两个主要理论问题涉及集体代理的本体论和心理学以及集体态度。主要的本体论问题是，我们是否应该将意向状态的主体纳入我们的本体论小组，还是只将意向性赋予其成员。主要的心理学问题是，如果我们承认有意向状态的群体受试者，第一，如何理解他们得到的是什么，它们与我们归因于个人的意向状态是相同还是不同，如果不同，具体如何；第二，参与群体行动的个人的态度有什么特殊之处，或者他们的态度支撑着对群体的意向性归因？更具体地说，就我们对个体代理的理解中已有的概念而言，我们能否理解参与群体代理或保持群体代理潜力的个人的态度有什么特殊之处，或者我们必须引入新的概念，无论是意向、相信等模式，还是这种态度的内容？这两个问题都涉及方法论个人主义者和整体主义者之间关于社会的辩论，第一个是关于社会的本体论，第二个是关于社会的意识形态。
Collective intentionality concerns the intentionality of groups or collectives. Intentionality is the property of being about, directed at, oriented toward, or representing objects, events, properties, and states of affairs. Examples of intentional states (states with intentionality, not just intentions) are belief, desire, hope, intention, admiration, perception, guilt, love, grief, fear, and so on. Collective intentionality involves joint, shared, or group intentionality and the intentionality of members (qua members) of groups that have joint or shared attitudes. More broadly, the study of collective intentionality concerns forms of intentionality that underpin social reality. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual, ontological, and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, that is, actions and attitudes of (or apparent attributions of such to) groups or collectives, their relations to individual actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning. It subsumes collective action, intention, thought, reasoning, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, responsibility, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, and how these underpin social practices, conventions, institutions, and social ontology. The two main theoretical questions in the study of collective intentionality concern the ontology and psychology of collective agency and collective attitudes. The main ontological question is whether we should admit into our ontology group subjects of intentional states or attribute intentionality only to their members. The main psychological questions are, if we admit group subjects of intentional states, first, how to understand what they come to, whether they are the same or different than the intentional states we attribute to individuals and if different exactly how, and, second, what is special about the attitudes of individuals who participate in group action or whose attitudes underpin attributions of intentionality to groups? More specifically, can we understand what is special about the attitudes of individuals who participate in group agency or sustain the potential for group agency in terms of concepts already available in our understanding of individual agency, or must we introduce new concepts either of the modes of intending, believing, etc., or in the contents of such attitudes? Both questions concern the debate between methodological individualists and holists about the social, the first with respect to its ontology, the second with respect to its ideology.