Provable Adversarial Safety in Cyber-Physical Systems
Provable Adversarial Safety in Cyber-Physical Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/eurosp57164.2023.00062
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发表时间：
2023-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. H. Castellanos;M. Maghenem;A. Cárdenas;R. Sanfelice;Jianying Zhou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. H. Castellanos;M. Maghenem;A. Cárdenas;R. Sanfelice;Jianying Zhou
大多数关于确保控制系统安全的提议本质上是启发式的，尽管它们增加了对目标的保护，但它们提供的安全保证并不清楚。提出了一种对网络物理系统(CPS)的安全保障进行建模的新方法。作为我们的主要案例研究，我们使用了最流行的控制系统安全试验台。我们首先提出了这个试验台的详细的正式模型，然后展示了原始配置如何容易受到单执行器的攻击。然后，我们提出了对控制系统的修改，并证明了我们修改后的系统是安全的，可以抵抗任意的单执行器攻击。
Most proposals for securing control systems are heuristic in nature, and while they increase the protection of their target, the security guarantees they provide are unclear. This paper proposes a new way of modeling the security guarantees of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) against arbitrary false command attacks. As our main case study, we use the most popular testbed for control systems security. We first propose a detailed formal model of this testbed and then show how the original configuration is vulnerable to a single-actuator attack. We then propose modifications to the control system and prove that our modified system is secure against arbitrary, single-actuator attacks.